Studies in the Political Economy of Regulation

  Daniel Carpenter, Department of Government, Harvard University

  [Some of these papers also appear under The FDA Project home page or my page on financial regulation. Those pages have many applied papers and papers of greater policy relevance.]

 

WORKING PAPERS:  

A Theory of Approval Regulation (with Mike Ting)

PUBLICATIONS:  

"Approval Regulation and the Endogenous Provision of Confidence: Theory and an Analogy to Consumer Finance Regulation" (with Justin Grimmer and Eric Lomazoff), Regulation and Governance 4 (4) December 2010, forthcoming; pre-print version available here, pdf.

"Early Entrant Protection in Approval Regulation: Theory and Evidence from FDA Drug Review," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 26 (2) (Fall 2010) [doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewp002]

“Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?” in Edward Balleisen and David Moss, editors, Towards a New Theory of Regulation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Part of the Tobin Project on Economic Regulation.

“Reputation, Information and Confidence – The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Regulation,” in Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell, editors, Public Choice and Public Law (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009).

“Regulation,” in Michael Kazin, editor, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009)

"Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas," (with Mike Ting) American Journal of Political Science 51 (4) (October 2007) 835-853. [Also available as a Working Paper in the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Program Working Paper Series]  

"Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator," American Political Science Review 98 (4) (November 2004), 613-631.  

"Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Product Approval," George Krause and Kenneth Meier, eds., Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).  

"Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval," American Journal of Political Science 46 (2) (July 2002): 490-505.

"Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation," American Political Science Review, 90 (2) (June 1996): 283-302.