Studies in the Political Economy of Regulation

Daniel Carpenter, Department of Government, Harvard University

[Some of these papers also appear under The FDA Project home page. That page has many applied papers and papers of greater policy relevance.]

WORKING PAPERS:

A Theory of Approval Regulation (with Mike Ting)

Regulatory Errors under Two-Sided Uncertainty, OR, The Political Economy of VIOXX (with Mike Ting) [Also available as a Working Paper in the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Program Working Paper Series]

PUBLICATIONS:

Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator, American Political Science Review 98 (4) (November 2004), 613-631.

Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Product Approval, George Krause and Kenneth Meier, eds., Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval, American Journal of Political Science 46 (2) (July 2002): 490-505.

Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, American Political Science Review, 90 (2) (June 1996): 283-302.