

Government 30

Lecture 19

Bureaucratic Politics: Organization and Contemporary Operation


April 19, 2006

ANNOUNCEMENTS

1. Third discussion papers due Monday, 4/24, 9AM.
2. Office hours are regular this week: Thursday 1-4PM.

Figure 8-1 Changes in Federal Civilian Employment


Number of federal civilian employees (1,000s)



Source: Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, *Vital Statistics on American Politics, 1999-2000* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 259-260; data for 1999-2004 from U.S. Office of Personnel Management, *Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics, Employment and Trends*, bimonthly release.

Figure 8-2 Federal Civilian Employment Per Capita

Federal employees per 1,000 population



Source: Data for 1921-1981 calculated by the authors from Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, *Year Statistics on American Politics 1999-2000* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 219-20; 315; data for 1962-2004: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 2005, Historical Tables," 301.

IV. Bureaucracy as a peculiarly Modern Type of Organization (Weber)

- A. Fixed & official jurisdictions -- official, rigid div of labor
- B. Clear distinction btw superiors ("bosses") and subordinates.
- C. Management based upon written documents ("files")
- D. Management presupposes training.
- E. Managing the office is a full-time job.
- F. Management by Rules.
- G. Advance of Bureaucracy via Technical Superiority.
Example: 19th century U.S. industrialization, as written in Alfred Chandler, *The Visible Hand*

Public Interest

- Agencies neutrally follow the missions given to them.
- Efficiencies: assumed
- Pathologies: Missions might be too narrowly or too broadly drawn. Resources might be insufficient.

Public Choice or Capture

- ❑ Regulation: agencies are captured by the very firms they regulate.
- ❑ Efficiencies: responsiveness to a coalition of interests outside the agency
- ❑ Pathologies: special interests dominate, and bureaucrats can become another special interest.

Reputation

- ❑ Military agencies: Army officer corps
- ❑ Regulatory agencies: FDA
- ❑ Efficiencies: (1) incentives to avoid error, (2) responsiveness to different constituencies.
- ❑ Pathologies: (1) high risk aversion, (2) aversion to admission of mistakes

War within the Union High Command

- ❑ Q: Why did patrician military officers (non-professionals) dominate Union Army leadership in 1864?
- ❑ Lincoln appoint non-professional generals to the Union Army high command: Benjamin Butler, Nathaniel Banks, John McClelland, John Fremont, Franz Sigel, John A. Logan.
- ❑ Military schools (careerist officers and their training institutions) did not yet have reputation for expertise and superior training.

War within the Union High Command

- “Professional recognition for any American occupation came down to a matter of trust – entrusting the occupational institution to produce specialists capable of performing in fields that the common man no longer understood.” (201)
- “It was not enough for military officers to declare themselves professionals; society must grant professional status and autonomy to those it acknowledges as the experts in a given occupation.”
- Only in the 20th century do military academies and Army General Staff get superior reputation within military, within society, within political institutions.
 - Thomas Goss (U.S. Army officer, strategic planner for Homeland Defense at U.S. Northern Command, Colo Springs), *The War Within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship During the Civil War* (Univer Press of Kansas, 2004).

Why did the FDA accelerate drug approval?

- 1980-2004: avg drug approval time falls by 60%+: 2.5 years to ~1yr.
- Capture has it wrong: firms had been asking for acceleration all along.
- Reputation theory offers an explanation: the political organization of patients, esp. their ability to affect the news.

Figure 1:
Growth of Disease-Advocacy Groups, 1993-1997
(foundings for 1996 likely underestimate)




Figure 1: Average Effects of Media Coverage, Advocate Wealth and FDA Staff on Drug Approval Times, 1970-2000
 [Estimates from Lognormal and Gamma Duration Models]

