Daniel Carpenter -- Research on Bureaucratic/Administrative Politics and Organization

Research on Bureaucratic Politics and Organization


Daniel Carpenter, Department of Government, Harvard University




The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Networks, Reputations and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).


Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).



Articles [some of these are also listed under the American Political Development page, or the FDA Project.


"Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation," American Political Science Review, 90 (2) (June 1996): 283-302.


"Centralization and the Corporate Metaphor in Executive Departments, 1880-1928," Studies in American Political Development, 12 (1) (Spring 1998): 106-147.


"Stochastic Prediction and Estimation of Nonlinear Political Durations: An Application to the Lifetime of Bureaus," in Political Complexity, ed. Diana Richards, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).


"State Building through Reputation Building: Policy Innovation and Coalitions of Esteem at the Post Office, 1883-1912," Studies in American Political Development 14 (2) (Fall 2000): 121-55.


"The Political Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy," Studies in American Political Development, 15 (1) (Spring 2001): 113-122.


"Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval," American Journal of Political Science 46 (2) (July 2002): 490-505.


"Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Product Approval," in George Krause and Kenneth Meier, eds., Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, ( Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

"Executive Power in American Institutional Development," (with Keith Whittington), Perspectives on Politics 1 (3) (September 2003): 495-513.

Winner, The 2000 Martha Joynt Kumar Award for Best Convention Paper relating to the Presidency delivered at the 1999 American Political Science Association meetings, Atlanta.


"Political Learning from Rare Events: Poisson Inference, Fiscal Constraints, and the Lifetime of Bureaus," with David Lewis. Political Analysis 12 (3) (Summer 2004), 211-244.


"Protection without Capture: Dynamic Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator," American Political Science Review 98 (4) (November 2004), 613-31.



"The Evolution of National Bureaucracy in the United States," Chapter Two (pp. 41-71) in Joel D. Aberbach and Mark Peterson, eds., The Institutions of American Democracy: The Executive Branch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).


"Robust Action and the Strategic Use of Ambiguity in a Bureaucratic Cohort: FDA Scientists and the Investigational New Drug Regulations of 1963," with Colin D. Moore.  In Formative Acts: American Politics in the Making, ed. Matt Glassman and Stephen Skowronek, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.


"Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas," with Michael Ting. American Journal of Political Science 51 (4) (October 2007) 835-853.


"Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration," Perspectives on Politics, 8 (3) (September 2010), 825-46.


The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion: FDA Review Deadlines and Postmarket Drug Safety, American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming (with Jacqueline Chattopadhyay, Susan Moffitt, and Clayton Nall). [A replication archive with code and auxiliary materials can be found here.]


"Reputation and Public Administration," with George Krause, Public Administration Review, forthcoming.