

Government 1521
Bureaucratic Politics:
Government, Military,
Social and Economic Organizations

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Lecture 15: Recruitment and Retention,
Selection and Socialization

Patronage and the
19th c. American State

What was the character of the benefits distributed by the 19th c. American state? The 19th c. state was a state of courts and parties, but it was also a *distributive state*.

Distributive functions of the 19th c. state:

- (1) PATRONAGE
- (2) land distribution
- (3) postal service
- (4) charters and special privileges/immunities
- (5) infrastructural aid – rivers and harbors construction, railways & canals.

Patronage and the
19th c. American State

Patronage and its character:

- (1) rotation in office
- (2) party assessments and contributions

Consistent w/ Social Policies in 19th c. America:

- (1) Common schools
- (2) Welfare provision for classes of dependents
- (3) patronage was a form of social policy

SUM: 19th c. social provision differed from contemporary welfare in (1) the lack of *entitlement* or property rights in welfare benefits, and (2) the concept of *earned* benefits.

**Merit Reform in
Civil Service Administration**

Skowronek: merit reform crucial b/c it places the American state on a par with European states.

- (1) a class and educational conduit to civil service (French *Les Grands Ecoles*, British "public schools," also Japan)
- (2) regularized and competitive recruitment 1870s ff.

I. The sources of dissatisfaction w/ patronage system.

- A. rotation in office hinders development of capacity and efficiency; promotion as well based on party loyalty
- B. assessments – inefficient and coercive.

**Merit Reform in
Civil Service Administration**

II. The merit system reform movement.

A. The Proposals.

- (1) appointment governed by "merit"; comp tests
- (2) tenure in office; couldn't fire for political reasons.
- (3) prohibition of pol assessments.

B. The Movers

- (1) business interests -- urban merchants, industrialists and finance K; "Half-Breeds."
- (2) moral reformers; bureaucratic intellectuals -- esp members of the eastern bars, e.g., Dorman Eaton.

(1877-1881) CS Reform associations emerge

**Merit Reform in
Civil Service Administration**

III. The Bill.

- A. The Event. Garfield assassinated 1881. Prompts formation of NCSRL, umbrella org uniting associations.
- B. Pendleton Act (1883) -- George Pendleton (D - Ohio). Assisted and finetuned by Dorman Eaton.

IV. The Pendleton Act.

- A. gives personal staff to President
- B. Civil Service Commission (CSC) enforces
- C. enforcement powers with president and Dept
- D. no governance of internal promotions

The Dilemma of Merit Reform

I. Skowronek: Pendleton Act had modest effect from 1883-1900.

- CSC was underequipped
- party prerogatives

II. **The Enforcement Problem:** After 1883, fate of CS reform lies in hands of Republican presidents.

- They are initially a principal obstacle to covering in.
- president and Department heads control *promotion policy* w/in departments.
- political assessments decline, so the issue animating moral reform pressure wanes.

The Dilemma of Merit Reform

III. Theoretical explanations for merit reform.

A. TC Analysis: ↓ed uncertainty costs; stable expectations. More efficient govt. Entrepreneurs: business interests should be in the lead.

B. Rep/Cult: the role of moral reformers. Rapid, discontinuous pace of institutional change. As with Prussian army general staff concept, other nations had it first.

- Dems had just taken control of Congress.
- Need to appeal to Mugwumps.
- Statist perspective: more skilled bureaucrats push for Δ and are covered in 1st.

The Puzzle of Bureaucratic Behavior

Kaufman's question: not just why variation, but why so little variation? Counterfactual: why not explosion?

Sanford Gordon (1999): procedural consistency is akin to "justice" as fairness.

Here, a question of org control. Why do Forest Rangers not do their own thing, or get captured by local interests, or shirk and be lazy?

Kaufman's Puzzle

"A tacit assumption in much administrative literature is that what the top officers of an organization want, the organization does, and that this is too routine to warrant study.

Perhaps this is frequently the case. But often it is not, as any military commander whose troops have broken and run from fire, or any labor union leader who has been embarrassed by a wildcat strike, or any department head whose program has been sabotaged by a recalcitrant bureau chief, or any law enforcement officer whose subordinates have been found guilty of corruption, or any of dozens of other kinds of "leaders" chagrined to discover their "followers" are no longer following, can sadly testify. **It does not "just happen" that the daily decisions and actions of the lower echelons make concrete realities of policy statements and declared objectives of the leadership; this takes planning and work.**

Challenges to Unity

1. Complexity of Job – fire control, timber management, local politics, recreation and land uses, range management
2. Time in the Field, Distance
3. Purposive Organizational Decentralization
4. Inconsistent Directives
5. Local Capture
6. Personal Preferences of Field Officers

"Pre-Forming" Decisions

Ex Ante influences:

1. Rules and budgets as Weberian controls on behavior.
2. Authorization, Direction and Prohibition.
 - *Forest Service Manual* (FS "bible")
3. Budget-making as behavioral constraint (compels planning and tradeoffs before the fact).
4. Operations manuals; adm "bibles" (*Forest Service Manual*). (March-Simon: standard operating procedures formalized and universally distributed).

Ex Post Constraints

Can also sanction behavior after the fact, affecting expected values of behavior before the fact.

1. Mandate encourage use of “diaries” (neo-Weberian records keeping)
2. Rotation of personnel, to avoid local-level capture, increase loyalty to central adm.
3. Application or distribution of penalties and sanctions (random or known/certain)

Recruitment and Retention

Biggest influence is not rules, penalties, but psych dispositions of Rangers.

Selection/Recruitment: “Forest officers are selected in a fashion that winnows out many of the men who probably lack the inherent predisposition to conform to the preformed decisions of the Forest Service, and that guarantees at least a minimum of technical competence.” [198]

Socialization and retention: *Within-bureau apprenticeship*.
“...vacancies are filled by promotion and transfer and never (for all practical purposes) by lateral entry.” [180]

Profession-Specific Recruitment

“One of the principal means to this end [the homogenization of professional personnel by the Forest Service] is the use of professional foresters in all types of specialized jobs. Not only are line officers, timber management staff men, and fire control specialists all foresters, as one would expect, so are the specialists in range management (who could be trained in animal husbandry as logically as in forestry), wildlife management (who could be biologists), personnel management, administrative management (whose academic training could well be in public administration or industrial engineering), and in other functions. Probably 90 per cent of the professional men engaged in the administration of the national forests are foresters.” [214]


Selection and Socialization

Kaufman on selection and socialization:

...the operations of the external influences may depend on successful manipulation of the personal preferences and perspectives “inside” the Rangers. *Systematic selection and training of personnel, and procedures for building identification with the Forest Service, increase Ranger receptivity to the communications of the central office.* They broaden what Simon has called the zone of acceptance, inculcating in field officers the predisposition to respond primarily to cues and signals from the leaders of the agency, and to resist conflicting influences from other sources.” [229; emph added]

Selection and Socialization: Analogues from Other Organizations

1. U.S. Army – selection from military academies, ROTC; socialization via training and other schools
2. USDA – selection from farm backgrounds and land grant colleges
3. University faculty – select from Ph.D. programs; all go through “publish or perish” tenure stage



Hierarchy and Behavior

Wilson: Look at layer of operation, hierarchy.

Incentives differ by layer/level.

- (1) Operators
- (2) Managers
- (3) Executives

March & Simon

Organismal satisficing model (conceptually) [68]

1. The lower the satisfaction, the more search for alternative programs
2. The more search. The higher the expected value of reward
3. The higher the expected value of reward, the higher the satisfaction.
4. The higher the expected value of reward, the higher the level of aspiration
5. The higher the level of aspiration, the lower the satisfaction.

Extra Slides on Brehm and Gates Study of Police Shirking

Production by teams propositions

PROPOSITION H1: With complete information, rewards and punishments influence the frequency of working and shirking.

PROPOSITION H2: If there is uncertainty in production and if agents are risk-averse or have limited endowments, monitoring as well as rewards and punishments influences the frequency of working and shirking.

Iterated production by teams propositions

PROPOSITION BB1: Rewards and punishments influence the frequency of working and shirking.

PROPOSITION BB2: Conformity among subordinates varies by the capabilities of leaders.

Organizational culture propositions

PROPOSITION KM1: Frequency of shirking or working is positively related to the adherence to a cultural norm for defection or cooperation.

PROPOSITION KM2: Conformity among subordinates toward a policy varies by the network of associations among subordinates.


PROPOSITION KM3: Given an adherence to a noncooperative cultural norm, subordinates are less responsive to any allocation of supervisory resources.

PROPOSITION KM4: Given an adherence to a cooperative cultural norm, subordinates are more responsive to any allocation of supervisory resources.

Table 1. Contrasting Propositions and Key Independent Variables

Independent Variable	H	BB	KM
Rewards and punishment	✓	✓	†
Frequency of supervision	†		
Subordination predispositions			✓
Conformity among subordinates		✓	✓

✓ denotes a key independent variable.
 † denotes a variable that is conditional.



The beta distribution is a function of two parameters, a and b :

$$\beta(a, b) = \frac{x^{a-1}(1-x)^{b-1}}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} \Gamma(a+b) \quad (1)$$

Simple exponentiation is sufficient:¹⁶

$$a = \exp(\text{compliance factors}) \quad (2)$$


$$b = \exp(\text{defection factors}) \quad (3)$$

¹⁴In fact, under certain values for the beta parameters, the beta distribution is *identical* to the gamma, Pearson VI, Student's t , F (Snedecor), and Cauchy distributions (Devroye 1986).

¹⁵The gamma function, $\Gamma()$, is a continuous interpolation of the factorial function:

$$\Gamma(x) = \int_0^\infty z^{x-1}e^{-z}dz$$

For integer values of x , $\Gamma(x) = (x - 1)!$.



**Table 2. OLS and Beta Estimates of Shirking by Police Officers,
1966 Police Behavior Data**

Variable	OLS		Beta				First Diff.
	Coeff.	SE	a Coeff.	SE	b Coeff.	SE	
Constant	.32*	.03	.32	.26	.67	.25	
Boston	-.07*	.02	.02	.15	.02	.15	-.02
Chicago	.02	.03	.17*	.02	.06*	.02	.07
% black	.06*	.03	.84*	.22	.51*	.20	.16
% white	.03	.03	.23	.23	.13	.24	-.03
Professionalism	-.31*	.05	1.10*	.41	2.74*	.42	-.46
Functional dislike	-.11*	.04	.56*	.26	1.03*	.25	.20
Solidary dislike	-.03	.03	-.05	.19	.64*	.26	.04
Solidary like	.10*	.03	-.05	.19	-.44*	.19	-.10
Satisfaction with supervisor	-.06*	.03	-.70*	.25	-.54*	.24	.03
Mobile patrol	.15*	.03	-.34	.23	-1.15*	.23	.27
Log-likelihood	190.20		234.78				
